I. INTRODUCTION
Federal law criminalizes a variety of terrorist activities, including the use of violence and certain weaponry, such as chemical or biological weapons. 1 Yet, federal law does not sufficiently empower law enforcement to go after the supporters of those committing acts of terrorism. the United States Supreme Court addressed the First Amendment rights of individuals and groups to advocate on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist organization in relation to the criminal prohibition of providing material support. However, in doing so, the Court's opinion avoided an analysis of the traditional categories of free speech protections and levels of scrutiny.
This article looks to the First Amendment analysis of various campaign finance law challenges, which provide a comparable framework for addressing freedom of speech concerns in the context of national security. The nature of law and policy in the post 9/11 world implicates fundamental questions about strategy, tactics, criminal justice, and the ontological nature of the war on terror. 5 Due in part to these challenges, Congress criminalized the act of providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 6 Resulting laws and regulations have led to restrictions and limits on the freedom of speech. 7 Borrowing from campaign finance law provides assistance in addressing obstacles faced by prosecutors, defense attorneys, and practitioners seeking to advise clients on their potential criminal liability.
Part II of the article introduces the key statute criminalizing the support of terrorism. Part III discusses a recent Supreme Court decision addressing this statute.
Part IV turns to campaign finance law as an alternative model in addressing the free speech issues presented by the current material support legal framework. Finally, Parts V and VI provide advice to prosecutors and defense attorneys for moving forward as this issue continues to develop in the legal system.
II. THE MATERIAL SUPPORT OFFENSE: CRIMINALIZING THE FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
Congress implemented two statutory provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, that make it a crime to provide material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations. 8 The first provision criminalizes the providing of material support or resources "knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out" various terrorist crimes. Loyola Law Review [Vol. 59 statute creates an offense for the provision of material support with the intent of furthering the terrorist act.
10
Conviction under this provision can result in a fifteen-year prison sentence and fines, or a much longer sentence if someone is killed as a result of the terrorist act supported by the defendant.
11
The second provision, which codifies the criminal prohibition of providing material support, is more broadly written. It punishes "whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so." 12 If convicted under this provision, a defendant can be sentenced to fifteen years in prison and fined, or can receive life term if someone dies as a result of the terrorist act promulgated. 13 Congress established this broader crime in an attempt to "fill the perceived gap" left by § 2339A, which does not reach those who gave money to terrorist organizations for proposed humanitarian efforts and not to further some terrorist act.
14 Congress feared that terrorist organizations could use the fungible nature of money to their advantage by diverting funds donated to provide, for example, food to the poor for the use of funding acts of violence. 15 Specifically, Congress made an official finding that the humanitarian efforts of foreign terrorist groups are tainted by their criminal acts, and that any contribution can support terrorist activity. 16 The requisite mens rea also differs between the two sections of the statute. Section 2339A requires the knowledge or intent that the material support provided would further the commission of an illegal terrorist act. 17 However, § 2339B only requires knowledge that one is providing material support to a known foreign terrorist organization. 18 The second provision, as a result, 11. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2011) (establishing the punishment for providing material support).
12. Id. § 2339B(a)(1). 13. Id. 14. Stacy, supra note 10, at 462-63 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43-45 n. 17 (1995) is much more flexible from the prosecutor's perspective because it eliminates the need to prove that the defendant knew his general provision of support would be used in the commission of a specific offense or attack. Additionally, § 2339B contains a less demanding standard by penalizing a defendant for providing material support to an organization the defendant knows, or should know, is a foreign terrorist organization. 19 The statute defines "material support" as: any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 20 The term "expert advice or assistance" was added to the material support definition in 2001, as part of the PATRIOT Act. 21 This expansion of the material support provision gave prosecutors a new weapon against terrorists.
Since the establishment of the material support provision and its expansion to include "expert advice or assistance," federal prosecutors have used the law as a key tool in combating terrorism. 22 Recent data indicates that, as of 2010, the statute concerning material support offenses was the statute most frequently used by prosecutors in the war on terror. ( holding that evidence that the organization the defendant was supporting was engaged in conspiracy to commit crimes of violence and property damage in a nation with whom the United States was at peace is sufficient to show defendant was offering support to a foreign terrorist organization); Goldberg v. UBS AG 660 F. Supp 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y 2009) (defendant-bank was culpable for providing support to a third party that it knew, or should have known, the support was received by a foreign terrorist organization and the bank did not report it).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2011 It is often charged alongside a federal conspiracy charge.
27
Congress eventually amended the definition of "training" to include "instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge." 28 The amendment, which was part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA), was a response to judicial decisions interpreting the term "material support" in differing ways.
29
The Ninth Circuit had held that these amendments cured § 2339B's vagueness issues as to the terms "personnel" and "expert advice and assistance," but not as to the terms "training" and "service."
30
The material support statute, after the IRPTA amendments, has become a key component of the nation's counterterrorism efforts, but, like many laws dealing with national security, there are civil liberty concerns. The Supreme Court recently addressed some of these concerns.
III. HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT

A. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In addressing the limits of humanitarian aid as applied to designated foreign terrorist organizations, the Supreme Court, in However, the Court rejected this argument and held that the material support statute was constitutional as applied to the particular forms of support that the HLP group sought to provide, including those activities which would constitute speech.
39
Chief Justice Roberts, in the majority opinion, asserted that the HLP group's proposed activities with the PKK and LTTE are "inconsistent with the text of the statute" and "untenable in light of the sections immediately surrounding" the statute. 40 Moreover, Justice Roberts reasoned that Congress's amendments plainly described the mental state required for criminal culpability, that is, to "knowingly" provide material support.
41
Roberts relied on the additional sections surrounding § 2339B, where he described congress as speaking plainly as to the "mental state for a violation" of the statute. 42 These sections contain language of specific intent that was included in § 2339B during the several amendments made to the statute. 43 To support the holding, the majority opinion distinguished the case from Scales v. United States, the case on which the HLP group relied. 44 The majority reasoned that the HLP case 45 was distinguishable from Scales, which involved the prohibition on mere membership in such violent organizations, pointing out that § 2339B does not prohibit membership, but does prohibit the providing of material support. 
VAGUENESS CHALLENGE
The HLP group also unsuccessfully argued that § 2339B is unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 47 According to the majority, the Ninth Circuit The Ninth Circuit held that "training," "service," and a portion of "expert advice or assistance" were impermissibly vague "because they applied to protected speech-regardless of whether those applications were clear" to potential defendants engaging in such speech activties. The Supreme Court in the HLP case held that a person of ordinary intelligence could easily understand that instructing a foreign terrorist organization on how to use international law to resolve disputes and on how to petition the United Nations would constitute "training" and "expert advice or assistance."
52
Applying the Williams standard to the HLP group's proposed conduct, the Court found that the statute was sufficiently written so that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the HLP group's proposed conduct was prohibited. 53 The Court reasoned that, "although the statute may not be clear in every application, the dispositive point is that its terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs' proposed conduct." 54 Notably, the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit's use of a hypothetical in determining that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as confusing elements of the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness. 55 The Ninth Circuit used the Government's statements from oral arguments indicating that the statute could prohibit the filing of an amicus brief on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist organization as a basis of its finding, As a result, the majority found the statute passed the vagueness test, as applied to the conduct of the HLP group, and was not unconstitutionally vague. 62
FREE SPEECH AND INDEPENDENT ADVOCACY
The Court also rejected the HLP group's assertions that the material support statute violated the First Amendment insofar as it criminalized the instruction of the PKK and LTTE in how to use international law and organizations to achieve their own goals.
63
The Court refined the issue to determine whether the Government could prohibit material support to the PKK and the LTTE in the form of the speech offered by the HLP group. In adopting the reasoning from this line of cases, the HLP majority rejected claims that money and support could be given only to the charitable side of a foreign terrorist organization.
65
The Court expressed concern with "how terrorist groups systematically conceal their activities behind charitable, social, and political fronts." 66 The old adage, "money is fungible," was central to how the Court viewed the provision of both money and training.
67
According to the Court, which deferred to legislative and executive branch analysis, such training could further terrorism in several ways. 68 Specifically, the Court expressed concern that such support could bring legitimacy to these two deadly organizations, provide means to attract and recruit personnel to carry out terrorist acts, and to support the families of those who supported the criminal terrorists. 69 This concern has been shared by humanitarian aid advocates for some time. 70 Additionally, the Court relied heavily on the Executive branch's assertion that separating support for a terrorist organization's terrorist and humanitarian activities is impractical. 71 Finally, the majority rejected the dissent's claim that there is no stopping point. 72 The Court stated that "Congress has settled 64 this "legitimacy" justification cannot by itself warrant suppression of political speech, advocacy, and association. Speech, association, and related activities on behalf of a group will often, perhaps always, help to legitimate that group. Thus, were the law to accept a "legitimating" effect, in and of itself and without qualification, as providing sufficient grounds for imposing such a ban, Yet, clear application of the strict scrutiny test is noticeably absent from the opinion. There is no discussion of the least restrictive means analysis. However, the Court did refer to combating terrorism as an undisputed compelling governmental interest-describing it as "an urgent objective of the highest order." 80 Additionally, the Court asserted that the statute itself was narrowly tailored. 81 Further, the Court acknowledged that the term "personnel" did not include an individual who independently advocates for the terrorist organization, without Amendment battle would be lost in untold instances where it should be won. Once one accepts this argument, there is no natural stopping place. The argument applies as strongly to "independent" as to "coordinated" advocacy. coordination with the organization.
82
The Court also noted how Congress had amended the statutory definition of "material support" in response to concerns from the lower courts, and required that the defendant know that the foreign terrorist organization has been designated by the Secretary of State or that it engages in terrorist activity. 83 In the HLP case, the Court employed a balancing test similar to the one used in Buckley v. Valeo, 84 a case where a law restricting the freedom of speech by limiting funds given to a candidate, but not direct expenditures made independently on behalf of a candidate, was challenged. Similarly, in HLP, the Court reasoned that, by leaving open the alternative means of independent advocacy, it was not infringing on the free speech rights of humanitarian aid groups. Only communication or support provided under the direction of or coordinated with the foreign terrorist organization was prohibited.
B. THE IMPACT ON HUMANITARIAN AID ORGANIZATIONS-ENFORCEMENT AND CONFUSION
Opponents of the Court's ruling argue that the result of Humanitarian Law Project will be a chilling effect on private humanitarian aid organizations in the United States.
85
One opponent of the decision, the Charity and Security Network, took a stance in opposition to the Court's findings. 86 This group of aid workers, lawyers, and scholars is a key actor in advocating for changing the material support statute, and they believe the assertion that humanitarian aid to such organizations is no longer allowed. This article argues that this stance is mistaken. 87 While the Charity and Security Network, for example, argue that A response from the accused asserted that their independent advocacy was not subject to prosecution. 96 Attorney General Mukasey and his allies also responded that they "felt quite secure, thank you, in relying on the protection Congress placed in the statute, backed up by the First Amendment." 97 This exchange among highly knowledgeable experts reveals the extent of confusion about the law in society as a whole, and thus also in the international humanitarian aid community.
IV. USING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW AS A STARTING POINT FOR INTERPRETING PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE MATERIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISM STATUTE CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Looking to other areas of law provides alternative frameworks for understanding the material support statutes. National security law, with its varied interactions with terrorism, is known for its complicated and opaque nature. 98 There are few black and white answers, and the resulting shades of gray leave judges, prosecutors, and civilians with little clarity. Michael Chertoff described the impact of the September 11th attacks as causing an "upheaval in the doctrine and legal architecture that govern our national security strategy." 98. See CONFRONTING TERROR, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the uncertain future and unanswered questions of legal and policy issues and the strategies and tactics of counterterrorism); JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY x-xi (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2012) (discussing the uncertain role of our traditional checks-and-balances constitutional framework in a post-9/11 world); DYCUS, supra note 2, at 1132-33 (discussing the function of courts in investigating and prosecution threats to national security).
99 
A. THE BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK
The Buckley decision involved a challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and related provisions within the Internal Revenue Code. 101 The 1971 act, as amended in 1974, criminalized the independent expenditure of more than $1,000 on behalf of any individual candidate.
102
FECA contained four basic types of regulations: disclosure regulations, limits on the size of campaign contributions, limits on independent expenditures, and regulations concerning the public financing of campaigns.
103
The central holding of Buckley was that the First Amendment permits government-imposed restrictions on campaign finance activities in order to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.
104
At the same time, the holding provided that independent expenditures-those not coordinated with candidates and made on behalf of a candidate by an independent third party-cannot be limited because they do not risk the same corruption or appearance of corruption associated with contributions made directly to candidates running for office. 105 Specifically, the Court upheld limitations on the size of contributions, while striking down similar limits on independent expenditures.
106
Expenditure limits, the Court reasoned, involve only a "marginal restriction" on the protected free speech rights of a potential contributor. Limits on independent expenditures related to a particular candidate, on the other hand, represent a "substantial" restraint on political speech.
109
Such a limit prevents average citizens from engaging in "the most effective modes of communication." 110 The Court reasoned that this limit was much more antithetical to political speech rights. 111 The Court also noted that the independent expenditure limit would place a higher burden on the freedom of association than does the contribution limit.
112
First, the Court reaffirmed that making a contribution is similar to joining a political party, and enables individuals to "pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals."
113
Contribution limits would still allow associations and candidates to aggregate large sums of money for the purpose of furthering effective political advocacy.
114
Independent expenditure limits, however, would prevent organizations or associations from aggregating funds in such a manner.
115
As a result, the Court reasoned that independent expenditure limits pose a much greater infringement on speech rights, while simple contribution limits impose only a marginal restriction on political speech rights.
116
B. SYNTHESIZING TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE RESTRICTIONS TO FIND A FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLE
The laws challenged in both Buckley and Humanitarian Law Project invoke similar frameworks when analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on speech. 
First, neither case involves pure speech rights; rather, they implicate speech rights in a more nuanced manner. The Buckley opinion reaffirmed that the First Amendment provides protection for political association and expression, and that such expression and advocacy is enhanced by group association. 119 Restrictions on contributions that an individual or group can make on a particular expression of political speech "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." 120 Nevertheless, the decisions in both cases implicate core First Amendment speech rights. In the area of campaign finance law, monetary contributions to political organizations were protected as association and expression.
121
Though limitations on political contributions were held to be constitutional, the Buckley decision also implies that a complete prohibition would likely be struck down as unconstitutional. Money facilitates speech; thus, a limit on expenditures and spending directly restricts speech.
123
Giving money to someone else also facilitates speech, but only the speech of the person to whom it is given.
In the context of terrorism prevention, the Court suggested that both the HLP group and the government took "extreme positions."
124
The Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project did not directly address whether donating money to a terrorist organization implicated the First Amendment, but both parties assumed that Congress would have the power to restrict such donations.
125
The HLP group argued that the material support statute restricted pure political speech, while the Government asserted that the regulation only addressed conduct.
126
Therefore, the HLP group argued that because pure political speech was implicated, the statute failed to meet even the intermediate scrutiny test from O'Brien.
127
The plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project originally argued that Buckley served as a basis for providing support to foreign terrorist organizations who were also engaged in political expression (presumably acts of terror were considered expression by the plaintiffs) because doing so was a form of political expression. 128 The Government asserted that the material support statute subjected conduct, not speech, to criminal liability, and, to the extent any speech was restricted, such speech should be wholly unprotected and ought to be treated like speech constituting a crime of conspiracy.
129
The Court disagreed, determining that speech rights were implicated and that the restriction was content based. In dismissing the claim that pure political speech is implicated, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that "material support" is prohibited, not "pure political speech," and such support may not even take the form of speech at all. 132 According to Roberts, the Government was wrong to assert that no speech was implicated. 133 Instead, he explained that "[t]he law here may be described as directed at conduct . . . but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message." Both cases implicate a similar balancing test, finding First Amendment rights to be strongest when one speaks for themselves and not others. 135 The test applied by the Court appears to weigh the government interest against the freedom of speech. 136 Both decisions also take into account whether independent action allows for the expression to take place outside the restriction. 137 Perhaps the only consensus generally held concerning the Humanitarian Law Project decision is the lack of a defined balancing test and confusion about which level of scrutiny was applied.
138
What is clear is that the Court weighed the government's interest in fighting terrorism against the freedom of speech. Similarly, the Buckley decision involves balancing the government's interest in combating political corruption against the freedom of speech. Both decisions invoke levels of scrutiny 131 that are not readily identifiable. Combined, the decisions tend to center on a principle of weighing the governmental interests against the right to engage in potentially harmful speech coordinated between the speaker and a third party.
The holding in Buckley, as previously discussed, allows the government to restrict the spending of money on behalf of a candidate if such actions are coordinated with the candidate's campaign. 139 At the same time, the government is not allowed to restrict expenditures made independently from the campaign.
140
Individuals can purchase advertisements supporting one candidate over another, but run afoul of federal law and would be subject to the relevant contribution restrictions if they did so in coordination with the official campaign. The Court's rationale for allowing this separation rested in part on the distinct harm Congress was trying to prevent. Congress was concerned that a lack of restrictions would result in bribery or corruption. 141 The Court reasoned that coordinated expenditures or contributions were more likely to illicit bribes or undue influence. 142 Conversely, independent expenditures avoided the appearance of impropriety, while still leaving open the opportunity to independently advocate for or against a candidate. This decision allowed the restriction on protected speech because of the compelling government interest in preventing corruption, as well as the existence of an alternative means of communicating the message-independent expenditures not coordinated with the campaign. Similarly, the Humanitarian Law Project decision upheld the criminal prohibition of providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations in the form of speech. 143 The analysis in this decision focused on the compelling government interest in fighting terrorism. 144 The Court reasoned that money truly is fungible, and that providing material support to terrorist organizations had the effect of both legitimizing the terrorist organization and allowing it to free up its own resources for unlawful or violent activities. 145 Again, the Court emphasized the existence of an exception for independent advocacy that is 139 In other words, one could write a news article, lobby Congress, or engage in a variety of independent forms of advocacy so long as the activities are not coordinated with the terrorist organization itself. These similarities suggest that the Court's treatment of speech in Buckley may reveal a workable framework for dealing with speech in the context of terrorism prosecutions. Buckley's progeny suggest that the similarities go even further.
C. SUBSEQUENT CASES
Subsequent cases further reveal that the material support statute shares a number of parallels with the Buckley line of cases. From the campaign finance law line of cases, the most significant recent development has been Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 147 but the cases since Buckley tell a broader story. Only two years after the Buckley decision, the Court again struck down a statute that prohibited contributions and independent expenditures by corporations in affecting referendum votes unless the referendum directly impacted the corporation's property or business.
148
The Court extended their Buckley decision, finding that it applied to the state regulations governing state candidate elections by applying the dual approach to expenditures and contributions. 149 In Citizens United, the Court again affirmed the Buckley framework regarding the importance of independent advocacy and allowed corporations to make unlimited independent expenditures for candidates running for federal office. There, the court ruled that § 2339B "is not aimed at interfering with the expressive component of [the organization's] conduct but at stopping aid to terrorist groups."
153
The Ninth Circuit has determined that defendants charged with material support under § 2339B had no First Amendment right to provide bombs or money to a terrorist organization, but were "entitled to publish articles" explaining why the organization had been mischaracterized as a terrorist organization. 154 The trend of distinguishing between independent advocacy and coordinating with or being under direction from the terrorist organization is not new. In United States v. Khan, the district court determined that there was no First Amendment concern involving a charge of providing material support in the form of personnel, because the personnel in question would be working under the direction of the terrorist organization-recruiting, purchasing supplies, and performing other similar activities. In doing so, they acknowledged that independent advocacy exempts a defendant from criminal liability.
157
In an unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit reasoned that a person of average intelligence would know that maintaining a website that posted training manuals and propaganda for a designated foreign terrorist organization is prohibited, and that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
158
This decision was issued in response to a vagueness challenge like the one seen in Humanitarian Law Project. The court reasoned that the challenged conduct of managing the website for the terrorist organization obviously fit into the definition of material support.
159
Though the court was dealing with a slightly different challenge here, it still assumed potential First Amendment implications and dismissed the challenge only because the communication at issue was "the core" of what the statute was designed to criminalize: the provision of support as defined in the statute. 160 Analyzing these cases together reveals a potentially consistent framework on which courts may interpret the material support statute's First Amendment implications in the future. Independent advocacy will continue to be a key factor in weighing the national security concerns against the free speech rights of those charged with providing material support. Courts will likely continue to uphold limits on coordinated actions or actions under the direction of a terrorist organization-when treated as lesser infringements upon the First Amendment, national security concerns and the desire to combat terrorism will likely outweigh the potential loss of speech in these cases. 
D. DEFERRING TO THE POLITICAL BRANCHES WHEN STRIKING A BALANCE
It is worth noting that both Humanitarian Law Project and Buckley give a significant level of deference to the political branches. The reason for this is likely that the restrictions in question "operate within the core of the First Amendment, and the governmental interests at stake are within the core of the democratic process." 161 Most scholars agree that Buckley is characterized by a "fluctuating deference to congressional determinations." 162 At the same time, Humanitarian Law Project gave deference to both Congressional and Executive findings on a key fact-Chief Justice Roberts' majority asserted that the Court should give deference to Congress's assessment of the effect of material support in advancing terrorist activities "given the sensitive national security and foreign relations interests at stake." 163 The Executive branch's assessment of factual questions about the activities of terrorist groups was also deserving of a certain amount of deference. 164 Both lines of cases give a great deal of deference to the coordinate political branches, suggesting that the Court was willing to find workable solutions that do not necessarily fit into the normal constitutional jurisprudence that might otherwise apply.
V. HOW TO PROSECUTE AND HOW TO ADVISE CLIENTS
National security law and foreign policy law tend to be extremely complex on the easiest of legal questions. Therefore, practitioners deserve not just an academic analysis but a practical approach to the more difficult problems. This section seeks to analyze how to address complex factual situations presented when prosecuting the material support of terrorism or advising clients on potential criminal liability. There are two primary types of violations of the statute: those involving the provision of tangible support, and those that provide intangible support in the form of advice, training, or other forms of advocacy. 165 framework provides a clearer understanding as to the constitutionality of prosecuting these types of cases.
A. EXCEPTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING AND MEDICINE
To start, there are some exceptions to the material support statute that apply before even considering the constitutionality of the statute's application. The statute enumerates two exceptions for the provision of "medicine or religious materials." 166 In 1996, Congress replaced the phrase "but does not include humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in such violations" with "expert medicine or religious materials." 167 The religious material exception is straightforward, and, as of yet, unchallenged in the courts, but the medical exception is more complicated. A hypothetical situation involves an American doctor for a humanitarian aid organization working in a region where a designated foreign terrorist organization operates. In the course of some sort of attack, a member of the terrorist organization is injured and transported to the doctor's clinic. The doctor knows there is a high likelihood that her new patient is a member of a foreign terrorist organization based upon information provided by others, but perhaps the fog of war has made it too difficult to determine whether her patient is a member of a foreign terrorist organization.
A concern of many aid groups is that the medical exception is too narrowly drawn and may not prevent a doctor in this situation from being held criminally liable. Some courts have limited the exception to a few instances of the provision of actual pharmaceuticals. 168 The court in Shah noted that Congress had intended to draw the exception very narrowly, and § 2339B's rejection of the mens rea requirement found in § 2339A implies that the exception under § 2339B is limited to the provision of pharmaceuticals and does not include providing medical services. 169 However, the same court reasoned that a doctor who treats a terrorist by random chance would not be criminally liable, nor would doctors working for groups like Doctors Without Borders be subject to prosecution under the government's view of § 2339B.
170
The court reasoned that doctors acting in these situations are not under the direction or control of a terrorist organization, but are acting independently; thus, the state would be unable to prove essential elements of the crime.
171
The government has expressed hesitation to prosecute in these situations. Assistant United States Attorney Karl Metzer stated that the government would not prosecute these sorts of cases because the inability to prove that the individual was acting under the direction or control of the designated foreign terrorist organization would exclude these doctors from criminal liability.
172
In contrast, a doctor who worked as an on-call physician for a designated foreign terrorist organization, and under the direction of the terrorist organization, was properly convicted of providing material support of terrorism.
173
The Second Circuit reasoned that only doctors who acted in coordination with designated foreign terrorist organizations to provide something beyond "substances qualifying as medicines" would be criminally liable. The difference drawn by the court is between a doctor who, by happenstance, assists an injured member of a terrorist organization and one who is essentially employed by or on retainer for a designated foreign terrorist organization.
The Humanitarian Law/Buckley framework applies to this hypothetical situation. The independent nature of aid groups like Doctors Without Borders, whom act independently and not under the direction or control of a foreign terrorist organization, precludes criminal liability under the material support statute. These stand in stark contrast to independent acts and coordinated acts, resulting in substantive legal differences in [T]he concern about Doctors Without Borders and all that is ill-founded because of the definition of personnel. The government is required to prove that Dr. Sabir worked or agreed to work under the terrorist organization's direction or control before he can be convicted under this statute. That eliminates the nongovernmental organizations and others who provide assistance on their own.).
Id.
173 
B. PROVIDING TANGIBLE MATERIAL SUPPORT
The simplest hypothetical of providing material support is one where an individual or group provides direct tangible material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. For example, an individual may give weapons, vehicles, computers, or the like, to a foreign terrorist organization with whom the individual identifies. Another example could involve an individual wanting to provide aid to an impoverished village abroad that happens to be in a region controlled by a designated foreign terrorist organization. The donor provides money to the foreign terrorist organization, but, because money is fungible, the terrorist organization can use it for illegal purposes. The donor has clearly violated the material support of terrorism statute.
An even easier hypothetical might consist of an American citizen who goes abroad to train members of a designated foreign terrorist organization on how to build suicide bombs or improvised explosive devices.
These are easy cases where prosecutors have little trouble convicting defendants, and lawyers have little trouble in advising clients to avoid such activities. The defendants in these cases have provided direct, tangible material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations.
A more difficult case presents itself where individuals have provided incidental material support. Some scholars have argued that aid groups face serious legal criminal liability if they allow any of their aid to fall into the hands of a designated foreign terrorist organization.
175
The hypothetical here involves, for instance, an aid group that has an agreement with a designated foreign terrorist organization to provide aid to a war-torn area. There is no agreement to make payments to the terrorist organization, but the aid group knows some of its aid will fall into 175. See Margulies, supra note 138, at 545, 557. the hands of the terrorist organization nonetheless. In this situation, the aid group would likely be required to take a variety of steps to insulate itself from liability. 176 Meanwhile, the government would have to prove that the aid group knew its aid was providing support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. The material support statute was not designed to apply to natural persons alone; rather, it can also be applied against organizations such as aid groups or banks that have a significant presence in the United States.
177
Congress defined the mental state required under the statute as having knowledge about the organization's connection to terrorism, not specific intent to advance the terrorist activities of the organization.
178
It is tempting for the prosecutor to end the inquisition there and assume that the case is easily won.
However, the law relating to tacit provision of tangible material support is not as clear-cut. Professor Peter Margulies points out that aid groups who fail to take due diligence by not setting up appropriate institutional controls could subject themselves to criminal liability. 179 Nevertheless, his hypothetical is predicated on the existence of an aid group that wantonly ignores all signs of corruption in their arrangement and refuses to take precautions, alert authorities, stop providing aid, adjust tactics, or take any action at all. 180 Liability would also rest upon the aid being directly diverted. One could hardly find criminal liability where an aid group is consistently robbed by a foreign terrorist organization. Having internal checks in place can rebut the government's otherwise strong case against an aid group.
181
This is consistent with the framework found in Buckley and Humanitarian Law Project. Here, the actor who engages in these sort of internal checks does not provide support willingly; in fact, actions are taken to actively rebut any chance of providing support. In the campaign finance law area, the Buckley decision recognized that the lack of coordination with the candidate decreases the threat of corruption the law was seeking to 176 has no criminal liability. As a result, it is highly unlikely a court would allow the government to charge or convict a criminal defense attorney representing a foreign terrorist organization member in a criminal trial.
Nevertheless, criminal defense attorneys should still be cautious in the scope of their representation. Legal representation of a designated foreign terrorist organization exposes the attorney to criminal liability under the material support statute in other contexts. The definition of material support includes the provision of "expert advice or assistance," defined as "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."
188
This definition includes the provision of legal services and representation. 189 Those who represent high security prisoners may therefore risk liability if they pass messages from their clients to the foreign terrorist organization concerning plans to advance other terrorist plots. 190 In United States v. Stewart, 191 the Second Circuit upheld the conviction of Lynn Stewart, who had helped her client, Sheikh Omar AbdelRahman, 192 pass secret communications to his followers that involved planning a terror attack. 193 The court reasoned that her actions constituted providing material support in the form of personnel, and her conviction was upheld.
194
The warning to other criminal defense attorneys is to be cautious in representing high security clients, and to avoid performing acts that go beyond providing a defense or risk criminal liability. The prosecution of Lynn Stewart is consistent with the established framework. Her actions as a defense attorney were perfectly lawful in representing her client. It was when she began providing services to her client's followers in the terrorist organization that Loyola Law Review [Vol. 59
she subjected herself to criminal liability. In doing so, she crossed over from independent advocacy to coordination with a designated foreign terrorist organization.
INDEPENDENT ADVOCACY
The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech of those seeking to individually advocate for a designated foreign terrorist organization. 195 Individuals can publish articles in support of a terrorist organization's goals, 196 and it is likely they could also write an opinion piece in a newspaper, lobby Congress on behalf of the foreign terrorist organization, and a variety of other acts. The only limit is that the actions taken are entirely independent of the terrorist organization, meaning they are not coordinated with or directed and controlled by the terrorist organization.
197
One clear point of law arising out of Humanitarian Law Project is the statute's inapplicability to independent advocacy. The material support statute itself precludes its application to independent advocacy. Independent advocacy is specifically excluded from the definition of "personnel," providing that an individual who acts "entirely independent of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization's direction or control." 198 Additionally, "service" was defined as referring to "concerted activity, not independent advocacy." This exception is consistent with the Buckley framework, where limits on independent expenditures were struck down as violations of the First Amendment, but contribution limits were upheld. 203 The potential harms Congress sought to preventpolitical corruption-were implicated differently depending on whether the money was in the form of a contribution or an independent expenditure. 204 Like acts coordinated with a terrorist organization, contributions to a campaign carry a higher risk of harm, and warrant a greater intrusion upon the freedom of speech. Conversely, actions taken independent from a terrorist organization, like independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate, have a much lower risk of harm and do not warrant restrictions on the freedom of speech. As a result, the HLP decision held that any independent advocacy that parties wish to engage in does not trigger criminal liability under § 2339B. [Vol. 59 appeals typically requires some minimum level of coordination with the parties. Questions as to which issues the amici wish to address, which facts or issues they should provide supplemental information for, and a variety of other factors go into the decision to file an amicus brief. Moreover, the filing of an amicus brief has the purpose of advancing the cause of a particular party. The difficult question is whether a party may file an amicus brief on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist organization.
The government, specifically Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, former Solicitor General, argued that material support statutes prohibit the provision of advice and even the filing of an amicus curiae brief on behalf of a terrorist organization. 207 Several Amici Curiae argued against this specific point, asserting that "the Government was incorrect in arguing below that submitting an amicus brief on a [designated foreign terrorist organization's] behalf would be prohibited as 'expert advice or assistance. '" 208 This argument rested, in part, on 31 C.F.R. § 597.505(a), a federal regulation that appears to allow attorneys to offer advice to a foreign terrorist organization on how to comply with United States law, specifically the Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations. 209 Some have argued that the licensing scheme established in the federal regulations is content neutral 210 and allows for the representation, the provision of expert opinion and advice, and the filing of an amicus brief on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist organization. 211 This approach, if adopted by the courts, is consistent with the framework established, and it properly separates the First Amendment considerations along the lines of coordinated activity and independent advocacy. Amici could file their supplemental briefs without acting under the direction of the terrorist organization, and thus avoid liability.
VI. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO FUTURE PROSECUTIONS CAN BE RESOLVED BY THE HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT/BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK
Practitioners should be aware that the HLP decision did not preclude future overbreadth challenges to the constitutionality of the material support statute. Rather, future applications of the statute to speech or advocacy may not satisfy challenges based on the First Amendment.
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A unique aspect of the HLP litigation, as previously discussed, is how, according to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit improperly combined the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines in its own analysis. 213 As a result, the Court did not rule on the potential overbreadth of § 2339B, but only found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct proposed by the HLP group. 214 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts specifically stated that a plaintiff may have a valid overbreadth claim. 215 Similarly, the Buckley decision addressed an overbreadth claim involving the level of the contribution limit.
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Challengers to the limit argued that the statutorily imposed $1,000 limit on contributions was unrealistically low considering that the amount of money required to run for different offices fluctuates. Court, however, asserted that it lacked a scalpel to probe whether, say, a theoretical $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as a $1,000.
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Nevertheless, subsequent cases following the Buckley analysis would take up such a scalpel. The Eighth Circuit, in Carver v. Nixon, held that Missouri's campaign contributions limit of $100 for state elections was not narrowly tailored enough to achieve the compelling government interest. 219 The Supreme Court made a similar decision in Randall v. Sorrell, finding that a contribution limit was so low as to no longer be narrowly tailored and thus in violation of the First Amendment rights of contributors.
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The HLP case is not a classic overbreadth challenge, but the principles are similar. Here, the Court's decision turned on whether the restrictions on speech had gone too far by restricting the dollar amount limit to an unconstitutionally low level.
Thus, practitioners should not be surprised if courts begin to find that certain applications of the material support statute violate the First Amendment on overbreadth grounds. The Randall v. Sorrell decision, combined with Chief Justice Robert's opinion in HLP, indicates that, though the Supreme Court may allow restrictions on the freedom of speech in certain circumstances, their willingness to do so is limited. It also suggests that, in the future, the Court could find a line that defines when the application of the material support statute goes too far. A good candidate for such a line could arise in a case involving the provision of medical services, advice, or training. The current case law does not define the medical exception. An American doctor working for Doctors Without Borders may be able to effectively challenge a court's decision to restrict her First Amendment rights by prohibiting her from training others how to dress wounds, perform CPR, or provide other basic medical services. The important note is that courts may draw lines as to how far the restrictions in Humanitarian Law Project can go toward limiting First Amendment rights, and they will likely follow the Buckley line of cases in making such determinations. 
VII. CONCLUSION
As the United States' fight against global terrorism continues, the Material Support of Terrorism statute becomes increasingly important. Though the actual number of cases filed each year is low, the frequency with which this statute is used in the fight against terrorism is significant.
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The present lack of judicial guidance in this field will inevitably lead to confusion in lower courts. Prosecutors, aid groups, defense attorneys, and others will need the courts, or Congress, to articulate clearer guidelines. In doing so, looking to how the courts have handled the complexities of First Amendment jurisprudence in the campaign finance area can provide guidance on how the courts may interpret the statute, apply it to particular defendants, or consider future constitutional challenges.
